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It has long been settled that copyright plays an important role
in the protection of computer software. Beyond the protection of
program code,1 however, the scope of copyright protection in a
computer program remains a matter of heated debate among com-
mentators and a matter of extreme confusion in the courts. This
judicial confusion is nicely exemplified by the Second Circuit's
1997 decision in Softel, Inc. v. Dragon Medical & Scientific Com-
munications, Inc.2 The Second Circuit, in Computer Associates
International, Inc. v. Altai,' had earlier established what has be-
come the most widely accepted test for separating protected from
unprotected elements in computer programs. The Softel panel,
01998 Dennis S. Karjala. All Rights Reserved.
Professor of Law, Arizona State University. I am indebted to Professor Leo Raskind
for his many helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.
2 Code is the specific listing of instructions or commands that the computer is to
execute. Most actual program writing is accomplished in 'source code,' a high-level
language whose commands do not have a one-to-one correspondence with the com-
mands actually executable by a given machine. Source code is, however, much easier
for human beings to work with than the actual set of machine language instructions. In
order to bring the program into useable (executable) form, the source code must be
translated into machine language ('object code') that can be represented to human be-
ings as the famous binary Os and 1s. In executable form, however, code must exist in
the computer's memory as wholly unreadable physical signals (such as a higher voltage
for a "1' and a lower voltage for a "0) in order for the machine to execute the pro-
gram. Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright, Computer Software, and the New Protectionism, 28
JURIMETRICS J. 33, 36-38 (1987) (hereinafter New Protectionism). See also the discussion
in Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc. 797 F.2d 1222, 1230-31 (3d Cir.
1986). It is well established that both object code and source code are protected by
the copyright in the computer program. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, 982 F.2d
693, 702 (2d Cir. 1992). Source and object code are often referred to as "literal code'
and exact subsets thereof as "literal elements' of the computer program. Other elements
of the program, such as structure sequence and organization ('SSO'), are sometimes
labelled the 'non-literal elements' of the program.
2 118 F.3d 955 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1300 (1998).
982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
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however, understood neither the correct technical application of the
Computer Associates test nor its implicit underlying policy basis. As
a result, the case resorted to metaphysics to determine what is pro-
tected "expression" in a computer program and what is not. Indeed,
much of the language of the Softel opinion harkens back to the
approach of the Third Circuit in Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow
Dental Laboratory, Inc,4 which was expressly rejected in Computer
Associates.' Thus, Softel is not a step forward but may, in fact,
represent a retrogression along the bumpy road to a coherent
system of intellectual property protection for computer software.
In this Comment I analyze Softel in some detail and explain
why the decision is in conflict with the policy underlying the Com-
puter Associates approach. I also explain how the Softel court sub-
stituted metaphysics for analysis by looking to case authorities in-
volving traditional works, such as novels and factual compilations,
and by ignoring the technological nature of computer software.
Recognizing that software is, in fact, technology-the technology for
using computers-is crucial for placing the analysis of copyright
scope on firm ground. The technological nature of computer pro-
grams distinguishes them from nearly all types of traditional copy-
right-protected works. To determine the scope of protection by
analogy to novels or compilations is inapt and leads to results that
are undesirable as a matter of social policy. Yet to treat them as
unique types of copyright subject matter-which they are-requires
a policy-based standard for separating protected "expression" from
unprotected "idea." I have written many articles in recent years
explaining the appropriate standard and how it is derived from a
coherent interpretation of intellectual property law as a whole,
especially the relationship between copyright and patent.6 The
Softel decision provides an opportunity to reiterate some of that
analysis in an attempt to illustrate how the Softel panel could have
better handled the problem before it.
4 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986).
s 982 F.2d at 705-06.
6 See, e.g., Dennis S. Karjala, A Coherent Theory for the Copyright Protection of
Computer Software and Recent Judicial Interpretations, 66 U. ON. L. REv. 53 (1997)
(hereinafter A Coherent Theory); Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright Protection of Computer
Programs, Reverse Engineering, and Professor Miller, 19 U. DAYTON L. REv. 975 (1994)
(hereinafter Reverse Engineering and Professor Miller); New Protectionism, supra note 1;
Dennis S. Karjala, The Relative Roles of Patent and Copyright in the Protection of Com-
puter Programs, _ JOHN MARSHALL J. COMP. & INFO. L. __ (forthcoming 1998) (herein-
after Relative Roles of Patent and Copyright).
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The doctrinal copyright question at issue in cases like Softel is
what constitutes protected "expression" in a computer program and
what constitutes unprotected "idea."7 The closest the Softel opinion
gets to a standard for distinguishing the two is the notion of merger
or, more precisely, the absence of merger.' That is to say, the court
reasoned that if a variety of possibilities exists for accomplishing
something through programming technology, any one of those
specific possibilities is protected expression.9 Merger, however, is
inadequate as a standard for separating idea from expression in
nonliteral elements of computer programs because it fails to take
into account the policies underlying the exclusions from copyright
protection contained in section 102(b) of the Copyright Act.'0 With
functional works like computer programs, we must analyze such
policies carefully, following the principles of Baker v. Selden," to
7 The term "idea' here is used as a shorthand for all original but copyright-unpro-
tected elements contained in a work. Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) (1994), states, "[Un no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illus-
trated, or embodied in such work.'
' Merger is a copyright doctrine that denies protection to what would otherwise be
protected expression when the idea or concept being expressed is amenable to a single,
or only a few, meaningful modes of statement. See Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co.,
379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967). As such, it exists as a limitation on the protection of ex-
pression that otherwise would be copyright protectable. It is not a doctrine that is de-
signed to specify in the first instance what elements of a work constitute its expression
and what elements constitute its idea. As Richard Stem has pointed out, to use absence
of merger-the existence of a number of ways of accomplishing an object-as a basis
for inferring expression fallaciously inverts the logic of Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99
(1879), and Morrissey, 379 F.2d at 675. Richard H. Stem, Copyright in Computer Pro-
gramming Languages, 17 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 321, 368-69 (1991); see also
infra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
9 See 118 F.3d 955, 965-66 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1300 (1998).
Here the court concluded that the alleged use of the same fifteen "functionally identical'
commands in Dragon's programs and the use of menus and external files to cause the
commands to cue modules of code created a colorable claim that there was expression
in Softel's design. See id. at 966. The court goes on to say that "even if there were
few ways to design such a program, it does not seem likely that Dragon would have to
use an identical structure and copy approximately fifteen out of fifteen commands.' Id.
at 966.
10 See supra note 7 for the text of section 102(b). Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99
(1879), for example, which denied copyright protection for a new accounting system
described in a book and which was partially codified by section 102(b), did not inquire
into how many other systems of accounting existed. It was enough to state that a fsys-
tem" of that type was not copyright subject matter, no matter how creative its author.
1 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (refusing to allow the stringent requirements of patent law to
be circumvented by recognizing copyright in patent subject matter).
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determine which elements should be protected by copyright and
which should be either free for further incremental improvement by
others or, if they meet the standards for patent or trade secret pro-
tection, be protected under those regimes.12 Copyright law's broad
"substantial similarity" test for infringement would unduly inhibit
the development of improved software products if applied to
nonliteral program elements like modular structure. 3
This Comment argues that copyright should protect computer
program code from verbatim copying or slavish mechanical or elec-
tronic translations. Other program elements, such as structure, se-
quence, and organization ("SSO") and elements of software inter-
faces, should not be protected by the copyright in the program
code, that is, by the computer program copyright. If they are to
receive intellectual property protection at all, that protection should
be sought in patent or trade secret law or, in the case of nonfunc-
tional elements of user interfaces (such as pictorial video game
characters), in an independent copyright covering that element as a
traditional copyright-protected work. Part I of this Comment discuss-
es the facts of Softel. Part II articulates a test for separating protected
"expression" from unprotected "idea" in a computer program, and
"2 See Julie E. Cohen, Reverse Engineering and the Rise of Electronic Vigilantism:
Intellectual Property Implications of 'Lock-Out" Programs, 68 S. CAL L. REv. 1091, 1200
(1995) [hereinafter Reverse Engineering] (treating section 102(b) functionality as the touch-
stone for evaluating the copyright protection of program nonliteral elements).
13 Whelan supplies a good description of program structure in terms of its modules
and subroutines:
The outline [of a solution to a complex programming problem] can take the
form of a flowchart, which will break down the solution into a series of
smaller units called "subroutines' or "modules,' each of which deals with
elements of the larger problem. . . . A program's efficiency depends in large
part on the arrangements of its modules and subroutines; although two pro-
grams could produce the same result, one might be more efficient because of
different internal arrangements of modules and subroutines. Because efficiency
is a prime concern in computer programs (an efficient program being obvious-
ly more valuable than a comparatively inefficient one), the arrangement of
modules and subroutines is a critical factor for any programmer. . . . As the
program structure is refined, the programmer must make decisions about what
data are needed [and related operational questions about data]. . . . [Tihere
are numerous ways the programmer can solve the data-organization problems
she or he faces. Each solution may have particular characteristics-efficiencies
or inefficiencies, conveniences or quirks-that differentiate it from other solu-
tions and make the overall program more or less desirable.
Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1230 (3d Cir. 1986)
(footnote and citation omitted). The term "modular structure' is thus the arrangement of
a program's modules.
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Part III applies that test to program SSO. Part IV then returns to the
Softel decision to illustrate how and where the Second Circuit panel
in that case lost its bearings and to speculate briefly on the
implications of the Softel decision for the future.
I. FAcTS OF SOFTEL
In Softel, the defendant Dragon produced interactive medical
information programs. Dragon hired Softel to assist in developing
some of the programming, especially code, that would retrieve and
display video images produced by Dragon artists. After a personality
dispute arose among representatives of the two parties, Dragon
ceased using Softel's services but continued to use Softel's retrieval
and display code in several new programs." The lower court
found Dragon liable for these unauthorized uses of Softel code, and
such finding was not at issue on appeal." However, following
Dragon's subsequent development of new programs designed to
work with different hardware and written in a different computer
language, Softel asserted a second copyright infringement claim.
This claim was that Dragon's new programs exhibited a substantial-
ly similar structure to Softel's programs in that they contained (1) a
hierarchy of menus, (2) functional modules, (3) external files, and
(4) English language commands.'6 The district court concluded that
none of these features could pass through the Computer Associates
filters: ' hierarchical menus were "one of the most efficient and
user-friendly interfaces," the use of functional modules and external
14 118 F.3d at 958-61.
11 Id. at 960.
16 Id. at 966.
7 Computer Associates establishes the now widely followed three-step 'Abstraction-
Filtration-Comparison' test for determining substantial similarity of expression in computer
program structure. 982 F.2d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1992). The second step-filtration-is the
key step for separating protected from unprotected elements of the structure. The idea is
that all unprotected elements get filtered out of the substantial similarity analysis at this
stage. The court describes the filtration process as follows:
This process [filtration] entails examining the structural components at each
level of abstraction to determine whether their particular inclusion at that level
was 'idea or was dictated by considerations of efficiency, so as to be neces-
sarily incidental to that idea; required by factors external to the program itself;
or taken from the public domain and hence is nonprotectable expression.
Id. at 707. Thus, there are at least three filters-efficiency, external factors, and public
domain-and perhaps a fourth for 'idea,' although nothing in the decision tells us how
to determine what the term 'idea' means.
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
files was common in the industry, and the use of English language
commands was logical and the most effective way for the program-
mer to keep track of such commands. 8 Consequently, the district
court denied infringement as to these programs' 9  and Softel
appealed.
The Second Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal of
these claims on the ground that the lower court did not properly
apply the Computer Associates filtering step. Softel claimed that it
had combined in an expressive way the four individual features
filtered out by the lower court but that the lower court had ignored
this argument and focused solely on the individual features."
Softel also argued that Dragon's programs employed fifteen com-
mands that were "functionally identical" to the fifteen commands
found in the Softel programs.2' The Second Circuit accepted this
argument by analogy to traditional works of authorship, such as
compilations of individually unprotected elements, abstract paint-
ings composed of individually unprotected geometric forms, and
literary works comprised of individually unprotected words.22 The
court found that Softel had presented at least some evidence to
support its argument that its way of combining the design elements
was expressive, and that the lower court had either ignored or
misanalyzed the argument.23  Consequently, it remanded the
18 Softel, Inc. v. Dragon Medical & Scientific Communications., Inc., No. 87 Civ.
0167, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9502, at *63-*66 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 1992).
19 The district court also made a factual finding that these programs 'were not in
any way derived from plaintiff's copyrighted work.' Id. at *41. The court did not base
any conclusions of law on this finding, however, and the Second Circuit did not discuss
it. Interestingly, the Second Circuit did note that Softel had cross-examined Dragon's
expert on whether the programs 'evolved' from Softel's, as part of its discussion that
Softel's argument was supported by some evidence. 118 F.3d at 966.
o See 118 F.3d at 963. Softel argued at trial, in language that was quoted by the
Second Circuit, that it had created an 'authoring language' that integrated the menus,
touchscreens, modules, external files, and commands into original copyright-protectable
expression. Id. at 965. Nowhere in the opinion is there a standard for what Softel
meant by 'expression,' although implicitly Softel seems to have been claiming that 'cre-
ativity' in the combination of features and absence of merger-the existence of other
ways to accomplish the same result-means protectable expression. However, creativity,
even coupled with the absence of merger, cannot in itself lead to a finding of protec-
tion when the section 102(b) exclusions are operative. See infra notes 39-41 & 65-68
and accompanying text.
21 See 118 F.3d at 965-66.
22 See id. at 964.
See id. at 966.
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case to the district court to determine whether the combination of
these elements was expressive and, if so, whether Dragon had
copied those expressive combinations.24
II. "EXPRESSION" IN A COMPUTER PROGRAM
That copyright protects computer programs is no longer a mat-
ter for debate. The 1980 amendments to the Copyright Act, particu-
larly the definition of a "computer program," make it clear that
programs are copyright subject matter." Equally clear is that the
program copyright, protects both source and object code from verba-
tim copying.26 The major issue, which has never been explicitly
addressed by Congress, is the scope of that protection. Because
copyright protects only "expression," we must, therefore, determine
what is meant by aexpression" in a computer program in order to
delineate the scope of protection.
24 See id. at 967.
2s In 1974, Congress established the National Commission on New Technological
Uses of Copyright Works ('CONTU) for the purpose of advising Congress on how best
to handle computer software under intellectual property law. In 1978, CONTU issued its
report entitled FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES
OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 3 (1978) [hereinafter CONTU Report]. Congress responded by
adopting the CONTU Report's recommendations almost verbatim. The most important
recommendation was to add to section 101 of the Copyright Act the definition of a
computer program: "a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly
in a computer in order to bring about a certain result.' 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (defini-
tion of "computer program'). It should be noted that the most natural reading of this
statutory definition is that the computer program is the code, that is, the "set of state-
ments or instructions' that bring about the program's intended function ("certain result').
While statutory language may be stretched when policy reasons seem compelling, in this
instance it is perverse to deviate from a natural reading because this reading is fully
congruent with the underlying policy of the statute. As this Comment explains, optimal
intellectual property policy also demands that copyright protection in programs be limit-
ed to code.
26 Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, 982 F.2d 693, 702 (2d Cir. 1992) ("It is now
well settled that the literal elements of computer programs, i.e., their source and object
codes, are the subject of copyright protection.'). CONTU was also concerned with, and
indeed only thought about, literal copying of code, such as photocopying source code
or transcribing it from magnetic tape to disk. See CONTU Report, supra note 25, at 22.
There is no reference in the CONTU Report to "nonliteral elements' of programs or to
their creative "structure, sequence, and organization.' See A Coherent Theory, supra note
6, at 67-68 & n.46.
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A. "Expression" under the Computer Associates Test
The Second Circuit's decision in Computer Associates makes
no attempt to define expression in a computer program, nor does it
supply a standard for determining what is expressive. The closest
Computer Associates comes to answering the question is in its
filtering step, where it sets forth some of the things that are not ex-
pression, that is, aspects of programs that are not protected by the
program copyright: elements dictated by considerations of efficiency
(which, according to the court, makes them necessarily incidental to
the unprotected idea being expressed) and elements dictated by
external factors." The court attempts to excuse its failure to define
expression by resort to the hoary quote from Learned Hand (with
reference to traditional literary works) that "nobody has ever been
able to fix that boundary [between idea and expression], and
nobody ever can."28
Computer Associates' recognition that the program copyright
does not protect efficient structures was a major step forward from
the expansive interpretation of the idea/expression dichotomy for
programs in the prior leading case, Whelan, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental
Laboratory, Inc.29 Whelan understood that efficiency was a prime
concern in program design and that a program's structure (the ar-
rangement of its modules and subroutines) was a large determinant
of program efficiency.0 It went on, however, to hold that the pro-
gram copyright covered program SSO, even efficient SSO, provided
there existed a variety of other structures (SSOs) that could do the
basic job at hand (in that case, organizing a dental laboratory)."
Thus, under Whelan, the idea/expression dichotomy in a computer
program was reduced to a question of merger. The result, however,
is to allow intellectual property protection in technology-the tradi-
tional subject matter of patent law-without any showing by the
rightholder that the technological innovation meets the stringent
27 982 F.2d at 707. The court here also restates the obvious point that elements
taken from the public domain are not protectable expression.
28 Id. at 704 (quoting Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir.
1930)).
29 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986).
0 Id. at 1230; see supra note 13.
31 Id. at 1240.
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requirements for patentability. 2 There can be no serious doubt that
new and nonobvious program SSO is eligible for patent protec-
tion.33
Nevertheless, Computer Associates' failure to deal more direct-
ly with what might constitute "expression" at the higher levels of
abstraction in a computer program34 makes its application at those
32 This was one of the key grounds for Baker v. Selden's denial of copyright in an
accounting system (a nonliteral element abstracted from the literal words describing it):
The novelty of the art or thing described or explained has nothing to do with
the validity of the copyright. To give to the author of the book an exclusive
property in the art described therein, when no examination of its novelty has
ever been officially made, would be a surprise and a fraud upon the public.
That is the province of letters-patent, not of copyright.
101 U.S. 99, 102 (1879). The Eleventh Circuit has recently expressed similar views
about the importance of maintaining the distinction between patent and copyright:
It is particularly important to exclude methods of operation and processes from
the scope of copyright in computer programs because much of the contents of
computer programs is patentable. Were we to permit an author to claim copy-
right protection for those elements of the work that should be the province of
patent law, we would be undermining the competitive principles that are
fundamental to the patent system.
Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1541 n.21 (11th Cir. 1996).
31 As the technology for designing computer programs, which in turn are the tech-
nology for operating computers, program 550 is patent subject matter and therefore
patentable if it meets the other patent requirements. For example, the recently granted
patent in the Lycos search engine covered a method for rapid digital searching on the
intemet; the claims described a series of steps implemented in the software, which is
essentially the structure of its implementing program. See Michael Warnecke, Breadth of
Lycos Search Engine Patent Could Have Far-Reaching Implications, 3 ELEc. COMMERCE &
L. (BNA) 840 Uuly 1, 1998); see also Relative Roles of Patent and Copyright, supra
note 6. This latter article argues that the 1996 Patent Guidelines, Examination Guidelines
for Computer-Related Inventions, 61 FED. REG. 7478 (1996), which treat physical medi-
ums on which computer programs are recorded as 'articles of manufacture,' have essen-
tially mooted the patent subject matter inquiry for computer programs. The only patent-
ability issues now are whether the applicant claims a new and nonobvious way of mak-
ing computers work better.
This analysis is strongly supported by State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature
Fin. Group, No. 96-1327, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 16869, which says that practical utility
or application is the sole factor that determines the section 101 subject matter question.
If the claimed invention has practical utility, patentability is determined under sections
102, 103, and 112 of the Patent Act (novelty, nonobviousness, and disclosure). Id. at
*19-20, *26. In another recent decision, a subject-matter challenge was not even raised.
See Reiffin v. Microsoft Corp., No. C-98-0266-VRW, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10518 (N.D.
Cal. July 10, 1998) (involving a patent on a technology called 'multi-threading,' which
allows computers to switch from one task to another so rapidly that they seem to be
performing both tasks at once). The defendant won a motion for summary judgment of
invalidity on the ground that the claims omitted essential elements of the invention as
originally disclosed in the written description. Id. at *25-26.
Computer Associates recognized that source and object code were copyright pro-
tected. See 982 F.2d 693, 702 (2d Cir. 1992). Code, therefore, was found to be expres-
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levels uncertain. This is clearly shown in the Computer Associates
opinion itself. The court refers to a core of protectable expression
remaining after the filtering process as a "golden nugget"" and
hypothesizes a "quantitatively small misappropriation which is, in
reality, a qualitatively vital aspect of the plaintiff's protectable ex-
pression."36 The court seems not to have fully grasped that all pro-
grams are written to accomplish, as efficiently as possible within the
constraints imposed by the hardware, other software, and econom-
ics, the function the program is intended to perform. 7 Program
structure is not chosen whimsically, nor is it chosen for aesthetic
reasons unrelated to function. A particular structure is chosen be-
cause the programmer believes that it will best optimize intended
program operations under the given constraints. Within those con-
straints, the program should, for example, run faster, make fewer
errors, crash less often, be less vulnerable to viruses, be easier to
install and repair, and easier to learn. Where not everything can be
the theoretical best (which is always the case), trade-offs must be
made. In short, this is an engineering problem. Given these facts of
technological life, it is impossible that any "golden nuggets" or even
an important (let alone a qualitatively vital) aspect of the SSO could
survive the filtering process.
B. "Expression" in Copyright Generally
The core problem at hand is that "expression" does not have
any generally determinable meaning in copyright law, other than
what the courts conclude to be protected in particular cases. 8 The
sive, since 'expression" (and not idea, process, method of operation, etc.) is what copy-
right protects.
-s 982 F.2d at 710.
36 Id. at 714.
"' Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Comput-
er Programs, 94 COLUM L. REV. 2308, 2353 (1994) ("At virtually all levels of abstraction
above the literal text, a program consists of procedures, processes, systems, methods of
operation, or their components."). They might have added that literal text (code) also
consists fundamentally of a method of operation or procedure. Because literal text is
copyright protected, we must assume that Congress intended at least that much of a
limitation on the exclusions of section 102(b), which alone was a big change from tradi-
tional copyright. There is no evidence that Congress intended to make any further limita-
tions on the fundamental exclusions from copyright protection set forth in section 102(b).
See A Coherent Theory, supra note 6, at 67-68.
1 Professor Cohen has argued that distinguishing between idea and expression within
the realm of traditional works of art is fraught with judicial value judgments of artistic
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terms "idea" and "expression" are not analytically useful words in
copyright because they are basically conclusions for what the courts
do, or do not, protect in specific circumstances. In fact, such terms
can become downright misleading if one falls into the trap of at-
taching to them an intuitive, everyday meaning divorced from the
underlying, complex copyright policies that seek to balance the
public benefits of creation incentives against those of free dissemi-
nation of information and culture. It is tempting, for example, to
label as "expressive" all those aspects of a work that result from the
exercise of intellectual creativity, at least if there is a variety of ways
to accomplish the same general result (absence of merger).39 How-
merit. Amy B. Cohen, Copyright Law and the Myth of Objectivity: The Idea-Expression
Dichotomy and the Inevitability of Artistic Value Judgments, 66 IND. LJ. 175 (1990).
Perhaps Judge Learned Hand meant something similar when he stated, in the context of
a traditional literary work, that no one would ever be able to fix the boundary between
protected expression and unprotected idea. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45
F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930); supra note 28 and accompanying text. Moreover, at least
one commentator, writing before digital technology had reached a mass audience, argued
for abandoning the idea/expression dichotomy altogether because of the impossibility of
coherently separating one from the other. His conclusion was that we should explicitly
recognize that copyright protects ideas. Robert Yale Libott, Round the Prickly Pear: The
Idea-Expression Fallacy in a Mass Communications World, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 735
(1967).
"' Feist Publications, Inc., v. Rural TeL Serv. Co. emphasizes the need for some
minimal level of creativity in order for a work to qualify as an original work of author-
ship. 499 U.S. 340, 345, 346, 348, 362 (1991). This has led some courts to find
protectable expression wherever they find creativity. A particularly egregious example of
this is the Tenth Circuit's decision in Autoskill, Inc. v. National Educ. Support Sys., Inc..
994 F.2d 1476, 1495 (10th Cir. 1993) (protecting a creative "keying procedure" or 'sys-
tem' used in a program to teach reading, without any recognition that both "systems"
and "procedures" are excluded from copyright protection under section 102(b)); see also
Compaq Computer Corp. v. Procom Tech., Inc., 908 F. Supp. 1409, 1418 (S.D. Tex.
1995) (treating a five-item collection of numerical parameters used for predicting comput-
er hard drive failure as a protectable compilation because it showed the requisite degree
of creativity); CMAX/Cleveland, Inc. v. UCR, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 337, 354 (M.D. Ga.
1992) (selection and arrangement of field names in a computer file structure equals ex-
pression); cf. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 79 (D.
Mass. 1990) (a pre-Feist case essentially equating expression with creativity: 'Copyright
protection would be perverse if it only protected mundane increments while leaving
unprotected as part of the public domain those advancements that are more strikingly
innovative.').
At issue in Feist was a factual compilation, which is a work that expressly qualifies
for copyright protection if it contains originality in its selection or arrangement of materi-
als, subject to the traditional limitations on copyright such as merger. Feist does not
hold the converse, namely, that any product of intellectual creativity is copyright protect-
ed. Nor does Feist hold that any creative selection or arrangement of materials is a
protectable compilation. An automobile is a selection and arrangement of elements, such
as a motor, radio, brakes, windows, sun roof, etc., and a wide variety of such selections
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ever, if an element of a work is excluded from protection under the
work's copyright by section 102(b) or the more general doctrine of
Baker v. Selden,4" such element will remain copyright unprotected
no matter how much creativity went into its production or how
many other ways there may be of accomplishing its result.41
Nonetheless, it is not true that everything is left to judicial
value judgments. Explicitly or implicitly, the decisions are trying to
will still result in a vehicle that gets its occupants from point A to point B. A novel is
a selection and arrangement of words, and a painting is a selection and arrangement of
colors. However, the automobile is not copyright protected at all, and novels and paint-
ings are protected as literary and PGS works, respectively, not as compilations. Cf.
Bibbero Sys., Inc. v. Colwell Sys., Inc., 893 F.2d 1104, 1108 n.3 (9th Cir. 1990) (reject-
ing the argument that a blank form could be a compilation because its inclusion within
another category-that of blank forms denied protection by Copyright Office regulation-
precluded its being copyright protected as a compilation). Traditional compilations, like
automobiles, novels, and paintings, have what might be termed a 'systematic organiza-
tion,, but the various elements of a compilation, in contrast to these other works, are
not used together as parts of an integrated whole. The content elements of compilations
are related, in that they are usually of the same general type (e.g., telephone numbers,
logarithms, judicial case reports), but users of compilations simply seek the individual
items they need and extract those items without reference to any of the other contents
at all.
I Baker v. Selden holds that patent subject matter cannot be the object of copyright
protection:
To give to the author of the book an exclusive property in the art described
therein, when no examination of its novelty has ever been officially made,
would be a surprise and a fraud upon the public. That is the province of
letters-patent, not of copyright. The claim to an invention or discovery of an
art or manufacture must be subjected to the examination of the Patent Office
before an exclusive right therein can be obtained; and it can only be secured
by a patent from the government.
101 U.S. 99, 102 (1879).
41 Consider the creative design of a useful article that is inseparable from its utili-
tarian function within the meaning of section 101. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (definition of
.pictoral, graphic, and sculptural works). Presumably, no one would argue that such
creativity results in copyright-protectable expression, because this statutory definition ex-
pressly excludes such inseparable utilitarian aspects of works from the PGS category. Id.
The same reasoning applies to any element of a work excluded from copyright protec-
tion by section 102(b). See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807,
816 (1st Cir. 1995) (expression is not copyright protected where it is part of a section
102(b) 'method of operation'). It is true that the scope of protection in a computer
program is not limited by the PGS separability test, because programs are literary rather
than PGS works. It is also true that Congress has limited the exclusions of both section
102(b) and Baker v. Selden in application to program code, because code can be said
to represent a process or method of operation, and yet, we know that Congress intend-
ed to protect it under copyright. See A Coherent Theory, supra note 6, at 60 n.19, 71,
100. There is no evidence, however, that Congress intended to protect noncode creativ-
ity under copyright, and there are good policy reasons for not extending the program
copyright very far beyond code. Id. at 67-69.
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balance-for the particular kind of work before the court-society's
interest in recognizing and rewarding the author for her efforts and
society's interest in having a free flow of information without the
transaction costs of copyright that might hinder rather than promote
further cultural development. As more and more copyright decisions
are rendered, both bench and bar develop an increasingly finely
tuned notion of how far protection should and does extend in par-
ticular kinds of works. While this fine-tuning remains imprecise for
works within the traditional core of copyright-works of art, music,
and literary fiction-the notion of a "thin" copyright for works like
histories, biographies, technical works, scientific works, and rule
books limits copyright protection to verbatim or near-verbatim lan-
guage.42 Thus, while the plot of a novel or play might be "expres-
sion,"43 the "plot" of a history is not. ' If we are to decide the
scope of copyright protection in a computer program by analogy to
traditional works, rather than treating them as the sui generis func-
tional works that they really are, the question is whether the most
nearly apt analogy is to fictional novels and plays or to historical,
scientific, and technical works. If the latter is the appropriate analo-
gy, the scope-of-protection question essentially answers itself: The
program copyright affords protection against literal copying and
mere slavish translations of code but does not extend to higher ele-
ments of program SSO, regardless of how creative such elements
may be.4
E.g., Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485, 488 (9th
Cir. 1984) (game strategy); Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1372
(5th Cir. 1981) (history); Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 980
(2d Cir. 1980) (historical theory); Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366
F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966) (biography); Continental Cas. Co. v. Beardsley, 253 F.2d 702
(2d Cir. 1958) (legal form); cf. Feist Pubs., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,
349 (1991) (copyright in a factual compilation is 'thin').
"I Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936) (udge Hand
finds that a film infringed the copyright in a play although both were based on a his-
torical incident). But see Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir.
1930) (udge Hand denies infringement for two somewhat similar stories).
' Hoehling, 618 F.2d at 980 (historical theory on the cause of the Hindenburg
disaster not infringed by a film adopting largely the same theory).
" If such elements really are creative, there is no reason that a patent would be
denied should the creator seek one. See supra note 33.
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C. A Policy-Based Test for "Expression" in Computer Programs
Another, and clearly better, way to give some content to the
idea/expression distinction in the context of computer programs is
to look to the policy underlying the decision to bring software un-
der copyright protection. Computer programs are sui generis among
copyright subject matter because of their inherent functionality.
They are not like dictionaries or maps, which are useful only insofar
as they supply information to human beings. A computer program is
not intended to be "read" or "understood" by its target audience, let
alone appeal to a user's sense of esthetics. 6 Rather, a program
causes, through the physical flow of electrical currents, a complex
set of switches inside a computer to set or reset in an orderly man-
ner so that the product of program execution can be regarded as
"information processing."4 7
Thus, a computer program is quintessentially technology. As
creative works of the human intellect, they are not distinguishable
from other technological products, which receive intellectual prop-
erty protection under patent and not copyright law. An executable
program creates a special-purpose machine out of a general purpose
computer. However, instead of designing that special-purpose
machine with the methodologies of traditional electronic circuitry,
technology has developed to permit the design by means of human-
readable symbols (source code) that can be entered through a key-
board and translated into the binary electronic signals constituting
the object code that governs operation of the computer. Therefore,
computer programming is simply a new method of circuit design.
Consequently, the natural mode of intellectual property protec-
tion for computer programs should have been patent (or trade se-
cret) law, as with any other advance in electronics. It is obvious,
however, that computer program code, especially programs in ob-
ject-code form, are vulnerable to fast, exact, and nearly costless
' Of course, what the program produces as output may seek to inform or appeal to
aesthetic sensibilities. These output products may well constitute copyright subject matter.
However, program interfaces in general, and user interfaces in particular, are not parts of
the program. Rather they are products of the program-part of that "certain result" that
execution of the program brings about. See supra note 25 (definition of "computer pro-
gram"); see also Computer Associates, 982 F.2d 693, 703 (2d Cir. 1992) (screen displays
'represent products of computer programs, rather than the programs themselves ... 
A Coherent Theory, supra note 6, at 72-76.
47 For a more elaborate description of computer programs as the technology for
making computers work, see New Protectionism, supra note 1, at 36-41.
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copying. Moreover, many computer programs fail to exhibit any
significant advance in the methodology for making computers work
better. Rather, they are simply straightforward, if sometimes costly,
applications of well known principles and computer languages to a
well defined problem. As such, they cannot meet the
nonobviousness requirement of patent law and, without copyright
protection or something like it, would be subject to slavish copying
by competitors who neither make the same investment in develop-
ment nor any improvements in the product. Many widely distribut-
ed programs would not be created or, if created, not widely offered,
if they were not protected from this kind of misappropriative
copying.
Therein lies the policy justification for protecting program code
under copyright law, notwithstanding its technological nature. As
stated at the outset, serious debate no longer exists over the pro-
tection of code by copyright law. The question that remains is
whether the policy underlying the copyright protection of code
applies to so-called "nonliteral elements" of the program and, in
particular for the purposes of the Softel case, whether it also justifies
the copyright protection of program SSO.
Ill. SSO As "EXPRESSION" IN A COMPUTER PROGRAM
Before considering whether an anti-misappropriation policy
supports the protection of SSO under copyright, inquiry should be
made as to whether there are other social policies, such as reward
for creative authorship, that might allow such a conclusion. It is
certainly true, for example, that the copyright in literary fiction
extends well beyond the verbatim language48 and affords broad,
exclusive rights to the author to control uses that cannot be charac-
terized as slavish copying.49 Many strong-protectionist commen-
tators have used this as a basis for arguing that computer programs
48 E.g., Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936) (movie
infringed rights in play); Anderson v. Stallone, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161 (C.D. Cal. 1989)
(entirely new script based on copyright-protected characters infringed).
" Professor Lemley has recommended that copyright law be changed to bring it
more into line with patent law regarding the rights of authors who 'improve' upon pro-
tected works. Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property
Law, 75 TEx. L. REv. 989, 1084 (1997). If his argument is accepted, it would seem to
end the debate in favor of non-copyright-protection of SSO independently of the argu-
ment presented herein.
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should be protected broadly as well, including, in particular, protec-
tion of SSO. s° These arguments, however, place the cart in front of
the horse. The Supreme Court has consistently stated that reward to
authors is an important but incidental benefit of our copyright sys-
tem, the primary purpose of which is to promote the public interest
in insuring broad availability of art, music, and literature."' Con-
gress undoubtedly has the power to change, within constitutional
limits, some of the underlying policy, but Congress has never at-
tempted to do so, either in general or with respect to program SSO
in particular.5 2 Those claiming a policy basis for copyright protec-
tion of programs by treating them as if they were novels or plays or
by assuming that the program copyright is aimed at rewarding tech-
nological creativity have the burden of showing that Congress in-
tended such a deviation from accepted copyright policy. The only
thing known for certain is that Congress, and its advisory committee
CONTU, saw a need to protect code from fast, cheap, and error-free
copying. Beyond that, Congress has simply not spoken to the issue.
More generally, there is good reason not to expand the copy-
right protection for computer programs much beyond code, and
especially to SSO, unless SSO, like code, is vulnerable to incentive-
eroding copying. Novel and nonobvious creative advances in SSO
' E.g., Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases, and
Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 HARV. L. REV. 977,
1008 (1993) ("computer programs are entitled to copyright protection under the same
principles that govern other literary works.').
s' Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) ("The immedi-
ate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an "author's' creative labor.
But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general
public good.'); see also Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 524 (1994) ("The prima-
ry objective of the Copyright Act is to encourage the production of original literary,
artistic, and musical expression for the good of the public.'); Feist Publications, Inc. v.
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991) (^The primary objective of copyright
is not to reward the labor of authors, but 'to promote the Progress of Science and use-
ful Arts"); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)
("The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor pri-
marily designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means
by which an important public purpose may be achieved.'); United States v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) ("The copyright law, like the patent statutes,
makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration.'); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286
U.S. 123, 127 (1932) ("The sole interest of the United States and the primary object in
conferring the [copyright] monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public
from the labors of authors.').
52 See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text; see also A Coherent Theory, supra
note 6, at 66-72.
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are patent subject matter."3 Patent law is carefully designed to limit
intellectual property rights in technological advances to those inven-
tions that meet its more stringent conditions of protection, including
approval of a trained examiner that the claimed invention meets
patent law standards. Competitive copying, and often improvement,
of unpatented inventions is an important part of the process by
which technology improves. Thus, to recognize copyright protec-
tion, which arises automatically upon fixation with essentially no
quality threshold, would allow creators in the particular field of
computer technology to make an end-run around the limitations of
patent law. 4
The above argument has been elaborated at length in my earli-
er works"5 and will not be reiterated here. The basic contention is
that SSO, as opposed to program code, is no more vulnerable to
incentive-eroding copying than most other technological products,
which receive only patent or trade secret protection (and certainly
not copyright protection). Anybody with a computer and a supply of
blank disks can copy code, and in quantity, but reverse engineering
a program to try to learn its structure is difficult and time-consum-
ing, even for specialists." Moreover, after some of the program's
structural components are learned, the competitor must write
noninfringing code, which must be tested, debugged, and marketed
under a trade name different from the original. Even without copy-
right protection for SSO, this effort by the competitor takes time and
money, which gives the original program creator important lead
time in the marketplace and prevents the competitor from undercut-
ting price too much when he finally markets his own noninfringing,
functional product."' Consequently, there is no need for copyright
See supra note 33.
See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
5 See, e.g., supra note 6.
Andrew Johnson-Laird, Software Reverse Engineering in the Real World, 19 U.
DAYTON L. REv. 843, 901 (1994).
I" The Whelan court correctly observed that writing the code was only a relatively
small part of producing a functional program:
By far the larger portion of the expense and difficulty in creating computer
programs is attributable to the development of the structure and logic of the
program, and to debugging, documentation and maintenance, rather than to
the coding.
797 F.2d 1222, 1231 (3d Cir. 1986). The court concluded that a copyright on the struc-
ture and logic would protect the programmer's "most valuable efforts. Id. at 1237.
However, it then rejected the defendant's argument that time and effort spent by the
competitor who uses the original program's structure but writes all original code should
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to protect SSO under an anti-misappropriation rationale and, given
SSO's technological nature, there is no reason not to rely on patent
and trade secret law-the traditional source of intellectual property
rights in technological works-to achieve an optimal level of
protection. 8
This general conclusion (that the program copyright should be
essentially limited to code) and most of its analytical underpinnings
receive additional support from Gillian C. Dempsey's recent, very
thorough study of the economics of information. 9 Ms. Dempsey
takes issue with the popular notion that essentially all technological
information is readily appropriable by competitors as soon as a
product embodying the information is released to the public. Rather
than viewing information as a commodity that, absent intellectual
property protection, would be unduly vulnerable to appropriation
by competitors, she argues that it is often more realistic to treat
information as a resource that grows incrementally through the
defeat a claim for infringement. The defendant's efforts, according to the court, were
irrelevant to the infringement question, which asks "simply whether the copyright
holder's expression has been copied." Id. This reasoning suffers from a fundamental
midstream shift in the policy basis of the argument. It recognizes a copyright based on
effort but refuses to consider effort in the infringement analysis.
Feist, of course, has now ruled out effort, or "sweat of the brow," as a source of
copyright protection, but Whelan was decided before Feist. Although Feist later held that
"sweat" copyrights in factual compilations ran counter to the statutory language, courts
had been inclined to recognize them because failure to do so would result in a type of
market failure: factual compilations are usually expensive to create but easy to copy
once created. There was at least a policy justification for some of what these pre-Feist
courts were doing, even if there was no basis in the statutory language. However, there
is no basis in either law or policy to recognize a "sweat' copyright and then to find
infringement when there is no market failure, that is, when the competitor has compara-
ble costs and therefore cannot undercut price. If the SSO is truly valuable, its creator
should go to the patent office.
"6 Professor Lunney has argued that the sole question in determining the copyright
scope of protection should be whether copying affords a disproportionate or undue com-
petitive advantage significantly greater than what we tolerate for non-copyright-protected
works generally. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Lotus v. Borland: Copyright and Computer Pro-
grams, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2397, 2427, 2435-36 (1996) [hereinafter Copyright and Computer
Programs]. While he would apply this approach to all copyright-protected works and not
just computer software, applying this approach to software would seem to reach the
same conclusion for program SSO as is presented herein. See also New Protectionism,
supra note 1, at 87-88, 95 (we should prevent "copying activity that substantially elimi-
nates the competitive commercial advantages enjoyed by technological innovators in
other fields who are first in the marketplace with a new product.').
s' Gillian C. Dempsey, Knowledge and Innovation in Intellectual Property: The Case
of Computer Program Copyright (1998) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Australian National
University) (on file with author).
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interactions of many innovators.6" Given the restrictions on these
informational interactions imposed by patent and trade secret law,
innovators usually have significant lead time in the market to secure
a return on their investment in innovation, without any need for
additional legal protection beyond the patent and trade secret re-
gimes. Indeed, additional legal protection would reduce or elimi-
nate the positive externalities that create, through such activities as
reverse engineering, an ever-growing and widely distributed general
pool of technological knowledge.
In particular, Ms. Dempsey distinguishes between information
technology and a physical product ("information technology arte-
fact") embodying that technology. She applies this conceptual
framework to computer programs using a detailed consideration of
their nature, including specific examples of compilation and
decompilation. She argues that the distributed physical product (a
program in object-code form) does not reveal the underlying tech-
nology (the source code). Competitors who do not copy code must
engage in an expensive and time-consuming reverse engineering
process, which eliminates the assumed easy appropriability of the
commodity view of information. Ms. Dempsey ultimately concludes
' This is also the conclusion of a recent study inquiring into the reasons for the
decline of Massachusetts's Route 128 as a leading center of innovation in electronics
and the continued success of California's Silicon Valley. AnnaLee Saxenian, REGIONAL
ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128 (1994) [herein-
after REGIONAL ADVANTAGE]. According to this study, Route 128 is dominated by a small
number of independent firms that internalize most industrial activities and enforce prac-
tices of secrecy and corporate loyalty. This leads to hierarchical structures in which
authority is centralized and information flows vertically within a single company, not
horizontally from company to company. Silicon Valley's success, on the other hand, is
attributed to its regional network-based industrial system that promotes collective learn-
ing:
The region's dense social networks and open labor markets encourage experi-
mentation and entrepreneurship. Companies compete intensely while at the
same time learning from one another about changing markets and technologies
through informal communication and collaborative practices; and loosely linked
team structures encourage horizontal communication among firm divisions and
with outside suppliers and customers. The functional boundaries within firms
are porous in a network system, as are the boundaries between firms them-
selves and between firms and local institutions such as trade associations and
universities.
Id. at 2-3. I am grateful to Professor Leo Raskind for having brought Ms. Saxenian's
work to my attention.
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that while replication of code should be prohibited, other forms of
imitative competition (provided that the competitors write their own
source code) should be encouraged.
IV. SOFTEL REVISITED
The Second Circuit panel in Softel neither noticed nor attempt-
ed to remedy Computer Associates' failure to articulate a coherent
definition of "expression" at the nonliteral levels of a computer
program. In fact, in terms of its technical copyright analysis, Softel
represents a definite step backwards. Softel rotely applies copyright
doctrine in generic terms, displaying no sensitivity to the technolog-
ical nature of computer programs and no awareness that even tradi-
tional copyright exhibits wide variation in the scope-of-protection
from one type of work to another."1 Thus, by failing to address the
special nature of computer programs, the court mistakenly charac-
terizes Softel's collection and arrangement of program mod-
ules-features dictated by technological considerations-as constitut-
ing elements of protectable expression in the form of a
compilation.62
Such characterization cannot be correct. Section 102(a) of the
Copyright Act lists a variety of "works of authorship" that constitute
copyright subject matter, including literary works, musical works,
and PGS works. Section 103 extends the subject matter of copyright
to compilations. The obvious intent of the drafters was to include
factual compilations like lists that do not fit comfortably within any
of the other categories. 3 There is utterly no indication that Con-
gress intended a novel to be treated as a compilation (a collection
of words) rather than as a literary work or that a painting should be
treated as a selection and arrangement of figures or colors rather
61 See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
62 See supra text accompanying note 22.
Many traditional compilations fit within the formal definition of a "literary work,'
which is defined as a work "expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical
symbols or indicia.' 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (definition of "literary works'). Perhaps a
better explanation of section 103's explicit inclusion of compilations in copyright subject
matter is that it was designed to insure that, for this particular class, judges would not
deny copyright protection simply because the information contained in the compilation
was factual. The definition of "compilation' in section 101 makes clear that the work is
formed by the collection, coordination, and arrangement of the preexisting materials or
data. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of "compilation'); see Feist, 499 U.S. 340, 354-61
(1991).
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than as a PGS work. Under the Softel court's analysis, nearly every-
thing in the. world is a compilation-a machine is a selection and
arrangement of various mechanical parts, for example, and a new
drug is a selection and arrangement of molecules. Softel wrote a
computer program, which is a literary work under the Copyright
Act. The issue is the scope of protection in that type of literary
work. Emphasizing selection and arrangement of modules, and
looking primarily for creativity (or the absence of merger) in that
selection and arrangement, diverts the analytical focus from the
underlying policies that should determine the appropriate scope of
protection for this kind of work.'
In particular, when dealing with functional subject matter other
than program code, it is imperative that courts consider the exclu-
sions from copyright protection commanded by section 102(b) of
the Copyright Act.6" Baker v. Selden illustrates that copyright pro-
tection does not follow merely from the exercise of intellectual
creativity or from a determination that there are many ways to ac-
complish the same result (absence of merger). The accounting sys-
tem in Baker was probably its most creative aspect, and yet copy-
right protection was denied to such system.66 Moreover, while
thousands of systems exist for keeping financial and accounting
records, the absence of merger did not result in copyright protec-
tion.67 Some highly creative products of the human intellect, such
as the Theory of Relativity, are not protected by intellectual property
law at all.6" Others are protected by patent law, provided the strin-
6 See supra note 39.
65 The copyright in program code is not limited by section 102(b), because Congress
intended to at least protect code under copyright; yet, code is clearly a 'method of
operation' or a 'process." See supra note 41.
6 Copyright and Computer Programs, supra note 58, at 2425.
67 See supra text accompanying notes 8-12; Reverse Engineering, supra note 12, at
1147 ('[M]erger is a tool for identifying instances in which expression otherwise
protectable by copyright is not protected. . . . The merger doctrine does not tell us how
to identify those aspects of a copyrighted work that are ineligible for copyright protec-
tion in the first instance."); A Coherent Theory, supra note 6, at 81-82. The First
Circuit's decision in Lotus compels this same conclusion. The trial court in Lotus had
concluded that there were many ways to design a menu command hierarchy, but that
fact was irrelevant because a menu command hierarchy was a copyright-unprotected
method of operation. 49 F.3d 807, 812, 815 (1st Cir. 1995).
" Physical theories are not excluded from intellectual property protection because
they are 'laws of nature" rather than the creations of human intellect. Nor can they be
excluded on the ground that they are "facts," notwithstanding Judge Easterbrook's recent
statement that Einstein's famous mass-energy relationship E-mce was an expression of
fact. American Dental Ass'n v. Delta Dental Plans Associated, 126 F.3d 977, 979 (7th
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gent conditions required for patent protection are satisfied. In both
cases, these limits on the legal protection of intellectual creativity
exist for good reason. The social cost of protection beyond these
limits-in the form of fewer new products and reduced dissemina-
tion of knowledge-would exceed the benefit derived by society
from the increase in incentives. Absent explicit congressional in-
structions, using copyright law to circumvent these well established
limitations should not be allowed.
The Softel court appeared to be impressed that Dragon's pro-
gram contained fifteen specific commands that were functionally
identical to those in Softel's protected program.69 Applying merger
analysis, the court did not find it likely that Dragon would have
been required to use both the four structural elements in Softel's
program7" and these same fifteen commands.71 However, the
opinion never considers the potential impact of section 102(b) on
the analysis. Softel's program was designed to retrieve and display
video images created by Dragon. The program evidently worked
well, as the competence of Softel's programmer was never ques-
tioned. It seems quite likely that the program would not have
Cir. 1997). While the relationship between mathematics and the physical universe re-
mains the subject of profound inquiry, no one seriously believes that 'nature' deter-
mines its ongoing course by solving the mathematical equations that human beings use
to make (usually very approximate) estimations of nature's course and how we can
change it. For over two centuries people thought Newton's laws of motion and gravity
were "laws of nature.' We now know that they were only approximations. No one
knows for sure how long Einstein's refinements of Newton's laws, which manifest them-
selves only in extreme circumstances but reflect a radically different underlying philoso-
phy, will remain what we call 'laws of nature.' All of these theories, and indeed all of
mathematics, are products of human intellect. If the sole goal of copyright were to pro-
tect human intellectual creativity, protecting these theories would have to be very high
on our list.
It is also true that a wide variety of physical theories may be, and indeed often
are, available to explain natural phenomena. Many of these physical theories are discard-
ed as additional evidence accumulates and as definitive experimental evidence rules out
certain possibilities. There is, in fact, an infinite number of incorrect physical theories
whose human expression would require highly creative thought. These theories are not
"laws of nature," yet we do not protect them under copyright or any other branch of
intellectual property law (except, perhaps, trade secret). Thus, neither intellectual creativi-
ty nor the mere absence of merger can be the basis for copyright protection. The
threshold question must always be whether the subject matter is copyright protected.
Given copyright subject matter (such as a computer program), the next question is
whether particular elements of the work are unprotected under section 102(b) or other
copyright exclusions, such as merger.
69 See 118 F.3d 955, 965-66 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1300 (1998).
70 See supra text accompanying notes 18-20.
"z See 118 F.3d at 966.
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worked without all of these fifteen commands because it was de-
signed it to do this job and not some other job. Presumably Softel's
programmer did not put in extra commands that were wholly un-
necessary. Moreover, these fifteen commands were sufficient to do
the job, which is presumably why the Softel programmer did not
use more than fifteen. Note that the claim was only that Dragon's
commands were functionally equivalent to those of Softel. Dragon
implemented these commands with its own code in a different
programming language. Such commands were correctly filtered out
of the infringement analysis by the lower court under Computer
Associates' efficiency filter and by the First Circuit's reasoning in
Lotus v. Borland that a hierarchical collection of functions consti-
tutes a section 102(b) unprotected "method of operation" or
"system."
Softel's bark may prove to be worse than its bite, at least in this
specific case. Although its analysis harkens back to the discredited
Whelan case, the actual error for which the court remanded was
that the lower court had not even considered the application of
Computer Associates' filters to the program SSO. The lower court
on remand should, therefore, still filter functional elements aimed at
efficient operation, which will include all of the SSO in question.
Properly effected, such analysis should come to the result that Drag-
on is not liable for copyright infringement based on the similar SSO
found in its independently coded programs.
The real problem with Softel, however, is its long-term effect
on the analysis of other courts within and without the Second Cir-
cuit. Not only was the court's doctrinal analysis superficial and
incorrect (in applying, for example, compilation concepts to novels,
paintings, and computer programs); the court also failed to consider
underlying policy, the fundamental limitations on copyright protec-
tion of section 102(b), and the need to separate patent and copy-
right subject matter to protect the integrity of the intellectual proper-
ty system as a whole. Other courts are likely to be tempted to fol-
low this doctrinally mechanical approach. To the extent they do,
Softel represents a retrogression.
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CONCLUSION
Courts that limit copyright protection in a computer program to
code, as seems compelled by the statutory language72 as well as
the intellectual property policies outlined above, need not fear that
they are failing to follow the dictates of Congress or that they are
leaving a valuable piece of United States technological leadership
vulnerable to piracy. 3 Congress has simply not spoken to the
question of the scope of copyright protection in a computer pro-
72 See supra note 25.
71 Over 10 years ago I criticized the protectionist trend evidenced by cases like
Whelan and surmised that the courts were basing decisions 'on an implicit policy view
that creativity and investment in program production need the incentive of a high level
of protection.' New Protectionism, supra note 1, at 35, 95. While Computer Associates
and Lotus show a much deeper judicial understanding of both the law and its underly-
ing policies, cases like Softel show that the task of bringing coherence to this subject is
far from finished. Consider Judge Keeton's observation in Paperback: it is no accident
that the world's strongest software industry is found in the United States, rather than in
some other jurisdiction which provides weaker protection for computer programs." Lotus
Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 75 (D. Mass. 1990). Judge
Keeton's attribution of U.S. hegemony in the computer software industry to strong copy-
right protection is unpersuasive. United States software dominance actually began in the
1960s and 1970s when intellectual property protection for computer programs was
thought to be either nonexistent or very weak. In particular, at least until 1986, every-
one assumed that copyright would not cover the user interface-the work at issue in
Paperback-because the only decision until that time had denied protection on function-
ality and section 102(b) grounds. See Synercom Tech., Inc. v. Univ. Computing Co., 462
F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978). The strongly protectionist decisions for user interfaces
did not appear until 1986 and 1987. See Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World,
Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986); Digital Communications Assocs. v. Softklone
Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ga. 1987). This trend, of course, was short-lived
as a result of the First Circuit's 1995 decision in Lotus. Lotus Development Corp. v.
Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 116
S. Ct. 804 (1996). It therefore seems unlikely that strong copyright protection could have
been a major contributing factor to U.S. innovation in program interfaces.
This misconception results from looking only at the incentive side of the copyright
equation, which assumes that more protection produces a greater incentive to create.
One must not ignore the other side, which values free use to further technological de-
velopment. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text. Indeed, AnnaLee Saxenian
has persuasively argued that long-term success in high-tech innovation may actually
require an environment in which ideas and know-how are actively exchanged, even
among fiercely competitive firms. REGIONAL ADVANTAGE, supra note 60, at 35-36 (point-
ing out that job mobility in the Silicon Valley contributes to this process by establishing
loyalties and friendships that transcend individual firms); see also Benjamin Kaplan, AN
UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 2 (1967) ("Education, after all, proceeds from a kind of
mimicry, and 'progress,' if it is not entirely an illusion, depends on generous indulgence
of copying.").
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gram.74 Moreover, while it is important to stop piracy, it is equally
important that intellectual property rules not hinder the complex
processes by which technology develops. That implies application
of the patent paradigm for protection of program elements that are
not vulnerable to piracy in the way program code is. Those advocat-
ing copyright protection of SSO under a piracy rationale must show
that SSO is, indeed, vulnerable to piracy. Unless that showing can
be made, SSO should be treated like all other products of
technology and left to its fate under patent or trade secret law.
Limiting copyright protection in computer programs to code
and slavish translations of code has at least one incidental but im-
portant advantage, namely, a significant reduction in the complexi-
ties of obtaining proof in program infringement cases.7" The scope
of expert witness testimony would be reduced, and in many cases
completely eliminated, because identity or near verbatim similarity
of code is much easier to recognize than similarities of structure. It
also removes an anomaly76 that can arise from overly casual appli-
cation of Computer Associates' efficiency filter: leaving efficient
SSO unprotected but protecting inefficient SSO, leading to the per-
verse result that the plaintiff must try to prove that her program,
which she is so eager to protect, is really not very good.77 The
copyright protection of computer programs, therefore, represents an
example in which statutory language, underlying policy, and even
incidental benefits come together to compel a fairly simple solution
to an otherwise very complex, almost intractable, problem. That
solution is to protect only the program code and slavish translations
of code under the program copyright.
74 See supra text accompanying note 52.
7 See New Protectionism, supra note 1, at 55, 67.
76 New Protectionism, supra note 1, at 83.
Reverse Engineering and Professor Miller, supra note 6, at 1003-04.

